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On this theory, indeed, I can always say to myself, when tempted,
If I yield to this temptation, my sin will be a moral advance. But it will
be equally true to say, If I do not yield to it, then my resistance will be
a moral advance. And thus there is no ground here for choosing either
course. To suppose that there was a ground for either would be to fall
into the same fallacy as that which asserts that Determinism must de-
stroy all resistance to temptation, because a Determinist believes that, if
he did commit the sin, it would be eternally necessary that he should
commit it.
186. Thus Hegel s theory offers no logical ground for choosing sin
rather than virtue. And it must also be remembered that it is not sin
alone which forms the moral advance, but sin which is followed by
retribution and amendment. This makes a considerable difference in the
psychological effect of the belief. Should a schoolboy be convinced that,
if he played truant, playing truant would be morally healthy for him, it
would be illogical, but perhaps not unnatural, that he should take this as
an argument for doing so. But if he were told that his moral advantage
would consist in the fact that the offence would bring on a punishment
sufficiently effective to cure him of any tendency to repeat the fault, it is
not probable that the theory would make the temptation any greater than
it had been before the metaphysical question was raised.
187. It is true that this theory does not lend itself to the deification
of Virtue it would scarcely be Hegel s if it did. It does not permit us to
regard the difference between Virtue and Sin as the fundamental differ-
ence of the universe, for there are conditions much worse than Sin. Nor
is it an ultimate difference, for the whole meaning of Sin is that it is a
stage which leads on to Virtue, and a moment which is transcended in it.
Hegel goes even further than this. For even Virtue is only a moment in a
still higher perfection.67 And again, whatever does happen to a moral
Studies in Hegelian Cosmology/149
being, whether it be Sin or Virtue, is, when it happens, a moral advance.
Such results are not adapted for moral declamations, but it may be
doubted if they have any more serious defect. If a man feels Virtue to be
a greater good for him than Sin, he will choose Virtue and reject Sin,
even though he should think that Sin is not wholly bad, nor the worst
possible state. All that is required of a theory of Sin, therefore, in order
that it may be harmless to morality, is that it should not deny the differ-
ence between Virtue and Sin, or assert that Sin is the greater good of the
two. Hegel s theory does not do either. To go further, and to condemn
Sin as absolutely and positively bad, is useless to morality, and fatal to
religion.68
188. We may notice that this theory provides a justification for a
belief which has flourished for a long period, especially in the English
race, without any metaphysical support. It has very commonly been
held that it is desirable that children should do certain things, for which,
when they have done them, it is desirable that they should be punished.
On most ethical theories this appears to be hopelessly unreasonable.
Either, it is said, an act deserves punishment, and then it ought not to be
done, or else it ought to be done, and then it cannot deserve punishment.
Some systems of education accept the first alternative, and some the
second, but they agree in rejecting the hypothesis that both the acts and
their punishment could be desirable. In spite of this, however, the old
view continues to be held, and to be acted on, perhaps, by some who do
not explicitly hold it.
If we follow Hegel, we may come to the conclusion that the unre-
flective opinion of the race has, either by chance or by a judicious com-
mon sense, grasped the truth with more success than its critics. For it is
evident that children, in relation to the morality of adults, are very often
exactly in the position which Hegel calls Innocence. And it may there-
fore be anticipated that, in the majority of cases, they will rise to that
morality most simply and completely by the process of alternate defi-
ance and suppression.
Such words as Sin, Retribution, and Amendment seem, no doubt,
unduly serious and pompous in this connection. But it must be remem-
bered that we are watching the process from the standpoint of the Syn-
thesis in a way which is seldom, if ever, possible when we are observing
the struggles of our fellow adults. (It is to this exceptional point of ob-
servation, I suppose, that we must ascribe the fact that many people
who would shrink from recognizing a moral advance in a night s drunk-
150/John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart
enness are quite able to see a moral advance in a forbidden pillow-
fight.) To one who fully comprehends the facts, Sin would always ap-
pear too futile to be taken seriously. It is necessary, no doubt, to take our
own sins and those of our neighbours very seriously, but that is because
we do not fully comprehend. For those who do, if there are such, the
most atrocious of our crimes may reveal themselves to have the same
triviality which even we can perceive in a schoolboy s surreptitious ciga-
rette. In heaven they whistle the devil to make them sport who know
that sin is vain. 69 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl chiara76.opx.pl
On this theory, indeed, I can always say to myself, when tempted,
If I yield to this temptation, my sin will be a moral advance. But it will
be equally true to say, If I do not yield to it, then my resistance will be
a moral advance. And thus there is no ground here for choosing either
course. To suppose that there was a ground for either would be to fall
into the same fallacy as that which asserts that Determinism must de-
stroy all resistance to temptation, because a Determinist believes that, if
he did commit the sin, it would be eternally necessary that he should
commit it.
186. Thus Hegel s theory offers no logical ground for choosing sin
rather than virtue. And it must also be remembered that it is not sin
alone which forms the moral advance, but sin which is followed by
retribution and amendment. This makes a considerable difference in the
psychological effect of the belief. Should a schoolboy be convinced that,
if he played truant, playing truant would be morally healthy for him, it
would be illogical, but perhaps not unnatural, that he should take this as
an argument for doing so. But if he were told that his moral advantage
would consist in the fact that the offence would bring on a punishment
sufficiently effective to cure him of any tendency to repeat the fault, it is
not probable that the theory would make the temptation any greater than
it had been before the metaphysical question was raised.
187. It is true that this theory does not lend itself to the deification
of Virtue it would scarcely be Hegel s if it did. It does not permit us to
regard the difference between Virtue and Sin as the fundamental differ-
ence of the universe, for there are conditions much worse than Sin. Nor
is it an ultimate difference, for the whole meaning of Sin is that it is a
stage which leads on to Virtue, and a moment which is transcended in it.
Hegel goes even further than this. For even Virtue is only a moment in a
still higher perfection.67 And again, whatever does happen to a moral
Studies in Hegelian Cosmology/149
being, whether it be Sin or Virtue, is, when it happens, a moral advance.
Such results are not adapted for moral declamations, but it may be
doubted if they have any more serious defect. If a man feels Virtue to be
a greater good for him than Sin, he will choose Virtue and reject Sin,
even though he should think that Sin is not wholly bad, nor the worst
possible state. All that is required of a theory of Sin, therefore, in order
that it may be harmless to morality, is that it should not deny the differ-
ence between Virtue and Sin, or assert that Sin is the greater good of the
two. Hegel s theory does not do either. To go further, and to condemn
Sin as absolutely and positively bad, is useless to morality, and fatal to
religion.68
188. We may notice that this theory provides a justification for a
belief which has flourished for a long period, especially in the English
race, without any metaphysical support. It has very commonly been
held that it is desirable that children should do certain things, for which,
when they have done them, it is desirable that they should be punished.
On most ethical theories this appears to be hopelessly unreasonable.
Either, it is said, an act deserves punishment, and then it ought not to be
done, or else it ought to be done, and then it cannot deserve punishment.
Some systems of education accept the first alternative, and some the
second, but they agree in rejecting the hypothesis that both the acts and
their punishment could be desirable. In spite of this, however, the old
view continues to be held, and to be acted on, perhaps, by some who do
not explicitly hold it.
If we follow Hegel, we may come to the conclusion that the unre-
flective opinion of the race has, either by chance or by a judicious com-
mon sense, grasped the truth with more success than its critics. For it is
evident that children, in relation to the morality of adults, are very often
exactly in the position which Hegel calls Innocence. And it may there-
fore be anticipated that, in the majority of cases, they will rise to that
morality most simply and completely by the process of alternate defi-
ance and suppression.
Such words as Sin, Retribution, and Amendment seem, no doubt,
unduly serious and pompous in this connection. But it must be remem-
bered that we are watching the process from the standpoint of the Syn-
thesis in a way which is seldom, if ever, possible when we are observing
the struggles of our fellow adults. (It is to this exceptional point of ob-
servation, I suppose, that we must ascribe the fact that many people
who would shrink from recognizing a moral advance in a night s drunk-
150/John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart
enness are quite able to see a moral advance in a forbidden pillow-
fight.) To one who fully comprehends the facts, Sin would always ap-
pear too futile to be taken seriously. It is necessary, no doubt, to take our
own sins and those of our neighbours very seriously, but that is because
we do not fully comprehend. For those who do, if there are such, the
most atrocious of our crimes may reveal themselves to have the same
triviality which even we can perceive in a schoolboy s surreptitious ciga-
rette. In heaven they whistle the devil to make them sport who know
that sin is vain. 69 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]