[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
especially after the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, and
subsequent revelations about its broader WMD ambitions.15 This aspect of the
asymmetric challenge is explored in further detail in a following section of this report.
B. TAKING STOCK
Over the last decade, the Department of Defense has allocated substantial assets
to the counterproliferation agenda, while also reorganizing a number of times to more
effectively achieve desired goals. The purpose of this paper is not to review this
budgetary, programmatic, or organizational history,16 rather, it is to take stock. Looking
back from the perspective of 2010, how far will we have come in addressing the
challenges of asymmetric warfare? One answer can be found by projecting forward
incremental improvements to each of the counterproliferation capabilities noted above.17
Passive Defenses: In general, over the last decade there has been progress in
funding shortfalls in deployed systems and in developing follow-on technologies. More
specifically:
14
This list of operational capabilities was compiled in Brad Roberts and Victor Utgoff,
Counterproliferation: A Mid-Term Review, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 1997.
15
David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New York, N.Y.: Crown
Publishers, 1996).
16
For a significant benchmark in the process of reorganization, see Combating Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, report from the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to
Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 1999.
17
See Chemical and Biological Defense Program: Annual Report to Congress, March 2000, Joint Service
Chemical and Biological Defense Program, FY00-FY01 Overview, and the Joint Warfighting Science
and Technology Plan.
10
" Individual protection: Over the last decade, progress has been made in fielding the
lighter-weight JSLIST suit and making it available in increasing quantities for the
forces, and in vaccinating the force against anthrax. Looking ahead to the next
decade, progress will be made in a number of areas. These include improved
protection gear that is less burdensome on the wearer (meaning that the
degradation effect of the need to operate in a protected posture on the overall war-
fight will be further reduced); as well as broader medical prophylaxis and
protection techniques, especially through exploitation of recombinant technology
for vaccine production.
" Collective protection: Over the last decade, progress has been made in making
such protection available to a larger number of critical facilities. In the coming
decade, further progress is expected in developing collective protection
capabilities for air- and sea-ports of debarkation and embarkation, for medical
facilities, and for naval vessels.
" Sensors and detection: Over the last decade, progress has been made in fielding
hand-held point detectors and in developing technologies for detecting some of
the most important biological threat agents, such as the Joint Biological Remote
Early Warning System. In the coming decade, substantial progress is expected in
fielding technologies allowing for improved early warning, with stand-off
detection systems employing laser and optical technologies as well as unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). These systems will integrate multiple technologies to
improve performance in detecting, identifying, and characterizing more
sophisticated threats.
Active defenses: Over the last decade, there have been limited deployments of the
Patriot systems and substantial investments in follow-on technologies. Looking ahead to
2010, expectations are high that improved capabilities will be deployed. At the theater
level, the Services expect to field high-performance systems against theater ballistic
missiles, and possibly also systems against cruise missiles. Conceivably, the Air-Borne
Laser system will supplement these capabilities in this timeframe, along perhaps with
boost-phase intercept systems. Within the 2010 timeframe, a limited national missile
defense is also a possibility.
Counterforce attack capabilities: Over the last decade, there have been
improvements to both conventional and nuclear means for attacking deep and hardened
targets, along with development of improved target planning tools. Looking ahead to the
coming decade, a number of significant improvements are expected. One is the fielding
of enhanced lethality warheads, capable of destroying munitions or stored CBW agent
with reduced risk of collateral damage. Another is the fielding of enhanced penetrators
for hardened targets, including especially conventional cruise missile systems. The
continued emphasis on agent defeat technologies is expected to pay dividends in the
development of ordnance that can render undestroyed stocks unusable. Improved damage
11
and combat assessment capabilities are promised through the development of UAV-based
systems.
Operational adjustments: Over the last decade, there has been some progress in
developing new joint and Service doctrine, plans at the CINC level for operations in an [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl chiara76.opx.pl
especially after the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, and
subsequent revelations about its broader WMD ambitions.15 This aspect of the
asymmetric challenge is explored in further detail in a following section of this report.
B. TAKING STOCK
Over the last decade, the Department of Defense has allocated substantial assets
to the counterproliferation agenda, while also reorganizing a number of times to more
effectively achieve desired goals. The purpose of this paper is not to review this
budgetary, programmatic, or organizational history,16 rather, it is to take stock. Looking
back from the perspective of 2010, how far will we have come in addressing the
challenges of asymmetric warfare? One answer can be found by projecting forward
incremental improvements to each of the counterproliferation capabilities noted above.17
Passive Defenses: In general, over the last decade there has been progress in
funding shortfalls in deployed systems and in developing follow-on technologies. More
specifically:
14
This list of operational capabilities was compiled in Brad Roberts and Victor Utgoff,
Counterproliferation: A Mid-Term Review, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 1997.
15
David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New York, N.Y.: Crown
Publishers, 1996).
16
For a significant benchmark in the process of reorganization, see Combating Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, report from the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to
Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 1999.
17
See Chemical and Biological Defense Program: Annual Report to Congress, March 2000, Joint Service
Chemical and Biological Defense Program, FY00-FY01 Overview, and the Joint Warfighting Science
and Technology Plan.
10
" Individual protection: Over the last decade, progress has been made in fielding the
lighter-weight JSLIST suit and making it available in increasing quantities for the
forces, and in vaccinating the force against anthrax. Looking ahead to the next
decade, progress will be made in a number of areas. These include improved
protection gear that is less burdensome on the wearer (meaning that the
degradation effect of the need to operate in a protected posture on the overall war-
fight will be further reduced); as well as broader medical prophylaxis and
protection techniques, especially through exploitation of recombinant technology
for vaccine production.
" Collective protection: Over the last decade, progress has been made in making
such protection available to a larger number of critical facilities. In the coming
decade, further progress is expected in developing collective protection
capabilities for air- and sea-ports of debarkation and embarkation, for medical
facilities, and for naval vessels.
" Sensors and detection: Over the last decade, progress has been made in fielding
hand-held point detectors and in developing technologies for detecting some of
the most important biological threat agents, such as the Joint Biological Remote
Early Warning System. In the coming decade, substantial progress is expected in
fielding technologies allowing for improved early warning, with stand-off
detection systems employing laser and optical technologies as well as unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). These systems will integrate multiple technologies to
improve performance in detecting, identifying, and characterizing more
sophisticated threats.
Active defenses: Over the last decade, there have been limited deployments of the
Patriot systems and substantial investments in follow-on technologies. Looking ahead to
2010, expectations are high that improved capabilities will be deployed. At the theater
level, the Services expect to field high-performance systems against theater ballistic
missiles, and possibly also systems against cruise missiles. Conceivably, the Air-Borne
Laser system will supplement these capabilities in this timeframe, along perhaps with
boost-phase intercept systems. Within the 2010 timeframe, a limited national missile
defense is also a possibility.
Counterforce attack capabilities: Over the last decade, there have been
improvements to both conventional and nuclear means for attacking deep and hardened
targets, along with development of improved target planning tools. Looking ahead to the
coming decade, a number of significant improvements are expected. One is the fielding
of enhanced lethality warheads, capable of destroying munitions or stored CBW agent
with reduced risk of collateral damage. Another is the fielding of enhanced penetrators
for hardened targets, including especially conventional cruise missile systems. The
continued emphasis on agent defeat technologies is expected to pay dividends in the
development of ordnance that can render undestroyed stocks unusable. Improved damage
11
and combat assessment capabilities are promised through the development of UAV-based
systems.
Operational adjustments: Over the last decade, there has been some progress in
developing new joint and Service doctrine, plans at the CINC level for operations in an [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]