[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
meanwhile by no means necessitate the phenomenological reductions, which for that
reason assume the form of something posited any which way. In spite of all the preserved
jurisdiction [Rechtsprechung] of reason they lead to irrationalism.
*4* [Footnote pg 109-110]
The subject-object relation in the judgement, as something purely logical, and the
relationship of subject and object, as something epistemological-material, are first of all
to be strictly distinguished; the terminus subject means something almost contradictory in
the former and latter. In the theory of judgement it is the basic assumption on which
something is predicated; in contrast to the act of judgement and that which is judged in
the synthesis of the judgement, in a certain sense the objectivity by which thinking is
confirmed. Epistemologically however the subject means the thought-function, many
times over also that existent which thinks and which is to be excluded from the concept
of the I only at the price that it ceases to mean, what it means. But this distinction
involves in spite of everything a close kinship of what is distinguished. The constellation
of a matter-at-hand found in the judgement in the language of phenomenology, that
which is judged as such and the synthesis, which is based on that matter-at-hand, just
as much as it produces it, is a reminder of the material one of the subject and object.
These differentiate themselves similarly, are not to be reduced to the pure identity of the
one or the other side, and condition each other there reciprocally, because no object is
determinable without the determination which makes it into such, the subject, and
because no subject can think anything which it cannot confront, not excepting even the
subject itself: thinking is chained to the existent. The parallel between logic and
epistemology is more than a mere analogy. The pure logical relationship between matter-
at-hand and synthesis, which would know space-time facticity irregardless of existence,
is in truth an abstraction of the subject-object relation. This is what the viewpoint of pure
thinking focuses on, neglecting all particular ontic matters-at-hand, without this
abstraction having any power however over the something which occupies the empty
place of substantiality, and which indeed means something substantial, no matter how
generally this is named, only becoming what it itself means through what is substantial.
The methodological procedure of the abstraction has its limit in the meaning of what it
wishes to hold in hand as pure form. The trace of the existent is inextinguishable in the
formal-logical something . The form Something is formed according the model of the
material, of the tode ti [Greek: individual thing, this-here]; it is the form of the material
and insofar requires that which is metalogical according to its own purely logical
meaning, for which the epistemological reflection strove as the counter-pole of thought.
*5* [Footnote pg 113]
Being as the fundamental theme of philosophy is no species of an existent, and yet it
concerns every existent. Its universality is to be sought higher. Being and the structure
of being lie beyond every existent and every possible existing determination of an
existent. Being is the transcendens [Latin: what transcends] pure and simple. The
transcendence of being as being-there [Daseins] is a distinctively superior one, insofar as
the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation lies in it. Every disclosure
of being as transcendens [Latin: transcendental] is transcendental cognition.
Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis [Latin:
transcendental truth]. (Heidegger, Being and Time, 6. Ed., Tuebingen 1949, Pg. 38)
*6* [Footnote pg 114]
That in spite of its contact with Hegel it detours around the dialectic, lends it the appeal
of achieved transcendence. Bulletproof against the dialectical reflection, though
incessantly touching on it, it runs its household according to traditional logic and charges
itself, after the model of the predicative judgement, with upholding the character of
solidity and unconditionality of that which would be merely a moment to dialectical
logic. For example, according to an initial formulation (see Heidegger, Being and Time,
op.cit. pg 13), being-there [Dasein] is supposed to be that which is ontic, that which is
existing, which has the secretly paradoxical advantage of being ontological. Being-
there is a German and ashamed variant of subject. It did not escape Heidegger, that it is
as much the principle of mediation as unmediated, that as the constituens [Latin: what
constitutes] it presupposes the constitutum [Latin: what is constituted], facticity. The
matter-at-hand is dialectical; Heidegger translates it at any cost into the logic of non-
contradictoriness. Out of the mutually contradictory moments of the subject, two
attributes are made, which he attaches to it as though to a substance. This however is of
assistance to the ontological dignity: the undeveloped contradiction becomes the surety of
something higher in itself, because it does not follow the conditions of discursive logic, in
whose language it is translated. By means of this projection the substance called being is
supposed to be something positive, as far beyond the concept as beyond the fact. Such
positivity could not withstand its dialectical reflection. These sorts of schemata are the
topoi [Greek: place, position] of fundamental ontology in its entirety. It derives [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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meanwhile by no means necessitate the phenomenological reductions, which for that
reason assume the form of something posited any which way. In spite of all the preserved
jurisdiction [Rechtsprechung] of reason they lead to irrationalism.
*4* [Footnote pg 109-110]
The subject-object relation in the judgement, as something purely logical, and the
relationship of subject and object, as something epistemological-material, are first of all
to be strictly distinguished; the terminus subject means something almost contradictory in
the former and latter. In the theory of judgement it is the basic assumption on which
something is predicated; in contrast to the act of judgement and that which is judged in
the synthesis of the judgement, in a certain sense the objectivity by which thinking is
confirmed. Epistemologically however the subject means the thought-function, many
times over also that existent which thinks and which is to be excluded from the concept
of the I only at the price that it ceases to mean, what it means. But this distinction
involves in spite of everything a close kinship of what is distinguished. The constellation
of a matter-at-hand found in the judgement in the language of phenomenology, that
which is judged as such and the synthesis, which is based on that matter-at-hand, just
as much as it produces it, is a reminder of the material one of the subject and object.
These differentiate themselves similarly, are not to be reduced to the pure identity of the
one or the other side, and condition each other there reciprocally, because no object is
determinable without the determination which makes it into such, the subject, and
because no subject can think anything which it cannot confront, not excepting even the
subject itself: thinking is chained to the existent. The parallel between logic and
epistemology is more than a mere analogy. The pure logical relationship between matter-
at-hand and synthesis, which would know space-time facticity irregardless of existence,
is in truth an abstraction of the subject-object relation. This is what the viewpoint of pure
thinking focuses on, neglecting all particular ontic matters-at-hand, without this
abstraction having any power however over the something which occupies the empty
place of substantiality, and which indeed means something substantial, no matter how
generally this is named, only becoming what it itself means through what is substantial.
The methodological procedure of the abstraction has its limit in the meaning of what it
wishes to hold in hand as pure form. The trace of the existent is inextinguishable in the
formal-logical something . The form Something is formed according the model of the
material, of the tode ti [Greek: individual thing, this-here]; it is the form of the material
and insofar requires that which is metalogical according to its own purely logical
meaning, for which the epistemological reflection strove as the counter-pole of thought.
*5* [Footnote pg 113]
Being as the fundamental theme of philosophy is no species of an existent, and yet it
concerns every existent. Its universality is to be sought higher. Being and the structure
of being lie beyond every existent and every possible existing determination of an
existent. Being is the transcendens [Latin: what transcends] pure and simple. The
transcendence of being as being-there [Daseins] is a distinctively superior one, insofar as
the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation lies in it. Every disclosure
of being as transcendens [Latin: transcendental] is transcendental cognition.
Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis [Latin:
transcendental truth]. (Heidegger, Being and Time, 6. Ed., Tuebingen 1949, Pg. 38)
*6* [Footnote pg 114]
That in spite of its contact with Hegel it detours around the dialectic, lends it the appeal
of achieved transcendence. Bulletproof against the dialectical reflection, though
incessantly touching on it, it runs its household according to traditional logic and charges
itself, after the model of the predicative judgement, with upholding the character of
solidity and unconditionality of that which would be merely a moment to dialectical
logic. For example, according to an initial formulation (see Heidegger, Being and Time,
op.cit. pg 13), being-there [Dasein] is supposed to be that which is ontic, that which is
existing, which has the secretly paradoxical advantage of being ontological. Being-
there is a German and ashamed variant of subject. It did not escape Heidegger, that it is
as much the principle of mediation as unmediated, that as the constituens [Latin: what
constitutes] it presupposes the constitutum [Latin: what is constituted], facticity. The
matter-at-hand is dialectical; Heidegger translates it at any cost into the logic of non-
contradictoriness. Out of the mutually contradictory moments of the subject, two
attributes are made, which he attaches to it as though to a substance. This however is of
assistance to the ontological dignity: the undeveloped contradiction becomes the surety of
something higher in itself, because it does not follow the conditions of discursive logic, in
whose language it is translated. By means of this projection the substance called being is
supposed to be something positive, as far beyond the concept as beyond the fact. Such
positivity could not withstand its dialectical reflection. These sorts of schemata are the
topoi [Greek: place, position] of fundamental ontology in its entirety. It derives [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]