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concerned with bodily appetites and pleasures; but we must grasp the
differences among the latter themselves. For, as has been said at
the beginning, some are human and natural both in kind and in magnitude,
others are brutish, and others are due to organic injuries and diseases.
Only with the first of these are temperance and self-indulgence
concerned;
this is why we call the lower animals neither temperate nor self-
indulgent
except by a metaphor, and only if some one race of animals exceeds
another as a whole in wantonness, destructiveness, and omnivorous
greed; these have no power of choice or calculation, but they are
departures from the natural norm, as, among men, madmen are. Now
brutishness
is a less evil than vice, though more alarming; for it is not that
the better part has been perverted, as in man,-they have no better
part. Thus it is like comparing a lifeless thing with a living in
respect of badness; for the badness of that which has no originative
source of movement is always less hurtful, and reason is an originative
source. Thus it is like comparing injustice in the abstract with an
unjust man. Each is in some sense worse; for a bad man will do ten
thousand times as much evil as a brute.
7
With regard to the pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions
arising through touch and taste, to which both self-indulgence and
temperance were formerly narrowed down, it possible to be in such
a state as to be defeated even by those of them which most people
master, or to master even those by which most people are defeated;
among these possibilities, those relating to pleasures are incontinence
and continence, those relating to pains softness and endurance. The
state of most people is intermediate, even if they lean more towards
the worse states.
Now, since some pleasures are necessary while others are not, and
are necessary up to a point while the excesses of them are not, nor
the deficiencies, and this is equally true of appetites and pains,
the man who pursues the excesses of things pleasant, or pursues to
excess necessary objects, and does so by choice, for their own sake
and not at all for the sake of any result distinct from them, is self-
indulgent;
for such a man is of necessity unlikely to repent, and therefore
incurable,
since a man who cannot repent cannot be cured. The man who is deficient
in his pursuit of them is the opposite of self-indulgent; the man
who is intermediate is temperate. Similarly, there is the man who
avoids bodily pains not because he is defeated by them but by choice.
(Of those who do not choose such acts, one kind of man is led to them
as a result of the pleasure involved, another because he avoids the
pain arising from the appetite, so that these types differ from one
another. Now any one would think worse of a man with no appetite or
with weak appetite were he to do something disgraceful, than if he
did it under the influence of powerful appetite, and worse of him
if he struck a blow not in anger than if he did it in anger; for what
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 93
would he have done if he had been strongly affected? This is why the
self-indulgent man is worse than the incontinent.) of the states named,
then, the latter is rather a kind of softness; the former is self-
indulgence.
While to the incontinent man is opposed the continent, to the soft
is opposed the man of endurance; for endurance consists in resisting,
while continence consists in conquering, and resisting and conquering
are different, as not being beaten is different from winning; this
is why continence is also more worthy of choice than endurance. Now
the man who is defective in respect of resistance to the things which
most men both resist and resist successfully is soft and effeminate;
for effeminacy too is a kind of softness; such a man trails his cloak
to avoid the pain of lifting it, and plays the invalid without thinking
himself wretched, though the man he imitates is a wretched man.
The case is similar with regard to continence and incontinence. For
if a man is defeated by violent and excessive pleasures or pains,
there is nothing wonderful in that; indeed we are ready to pardon
him if he has resisted, as Theodectes' Philoctetes does when bitten
by the snake, or Carcinus' Cercyon in the Alope, and as people who
try to restrain their laughter burst out into a guffaw, as happened
to Xenophantus. But it is surprising if a man is defeated by and cannot
resist pleasures or pains which most men can hold out against, when
this is not due to heredity or disease, like the softness that is
hereditary with the kings of the Scythians, or that which distinguishes
the female sex from the male.
The lover of amusement, too, is thought to be self-indulgent, but
is really soft. For amusement is a relaxation, since it is a rest
from work; and the lover of amusement is one of the people who go
to excess in this.
Of incontinence one kind is impetuosity, another weakness. For some
men after deliberating fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the
conclusions of their deliberation, others because they have not
deliberated
are led by their emotion; since some men (just as people who first
tickle others are not tickled themselves), if they have first perceived
and seen what is coming and have first roused themselves and their
calculative faculty, are not defeated by their emotion, whether it
be pleasant or painful. It is keen and excitable people that suffer
especially from the impetuous form of incontinence; for the former
by reason of their quickness and the latter by reason of the violence
of their passions do not await the argument, because they are apt
to follow their imagination.
8
The self-indulgent man, as was said, is not apt to repent; for he
stands by his choice; but incontinent man is likely to repent. This
is why the position is not as it was expressed in the formulation
of the problem, but the selfindulgent man is incurable and the
incontinent
man curable; for wickedness is like a disease such as dropsy or
consumption,
while incontinence is like epilepsy; the former is a permanent, the
latter an intermittent badness. And generally incontinence and vice
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 94
are different in kind; vice is unconscious of itself, incontinence
is not (of incontinent men themselves, those who become temporarily
beside themselves are better than those who have the rational principle
but do not abide by it, since the latter are defeated by a weaker
passion, and do not act without previous deliberation like the others);
for the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and
on little wine, i.e. on less than most people.
Evidently, then, incontinence is not vice (though perhaps it is so
in a qualified sense); for incontinence is contrary to choice while
vice is in accordance with choice; not but what they are similar in
respect of the actions they lead to; as in the saying of Demodocus
about the Milesians, 'the Milesians are not without sense, but they [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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concerned with bodily appetites and pleasures; but we must grasp the
differences among the latter themselves. For, as has been said at
the beginning, some are human and natural both in kind and in magnitude,
others are brutish, and others are due to organic injuries and diseases.
Only with the first of these are temperance and self-indulgence
concerned;
this is why we call the lower animals neither temperate nor self-
indulgent
except by a metaphor, and only if some one race of animals exceeds
another as a whole in wantonness, destructiveness, and omnivorous
greed; these have no power of choice or calculation, but they are
departures from the natural norm, as, among men, madmen are. Now
brutishness
is a less evil than vice, though more alarming; for it is not that
the better part has been perverted, as in man,-they have no better
part. Thus it is like comparing a lifeless thing with a living in
respect of badness; for the badness of that which has no originative
source of movement is always less hurtful, and reason is an originative
source. Thus it is like comparing injustice in the abstract with an
unjust man. Each is in some sense worse; for a bad man will do ten
thousand times as much evil as a brute.
7
With regard to the pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions
arising through touch and taste, to which both self-indulgence and
temperance were formerly narrowed down, it possible to be in such
a state as to be defeated even by those of them which most people
master, or to master even those by which most people are defeated;
among these possibilities, those relating to pleasures are incontinence
and continence, those relating to pains softness and endurance. The
state of most people is intermediate, even if they lean more towards
the worse states.
Now, since some pleasures are necessary while others are not, and
are necessary up to a point while the excesses of them are not, nor
the deficiencies, and this is equally true of appetites and pains,
the man who pursues the excesses of things pleasant, or pursues to
excess necessary objects, and does so by choice, for their own sake
and not at all for the sake of any result distinct from them, is self-
indulgent;
for such a man is of necessity unlikely to repent, and therefore
incurable,
since a man who cannot repent cannot be cured. The man who is deficient
in his pursuit of them is the opposite of self-indulgent; the man
who is intermediate is temperate. Similarly, there is the man who
avoids bodily pains not because he is defeated by them but by choice.
(Of those who do not choose such acts, one kind of man is led to them
as a result of the pleasure involved, another because he avoids the
pain arising from the appetite, so that these types differ from one
another. Now any one would think worse of a man with no appetite or
with weak appetite were he to do something disgraceful, than if he
did it under the influence of powerful appetite, and worse of him
if he struck a blow not in anger than if he did it in anger; for what
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 93
would he have done if he had been strongly affected? This is why the
self-indulgent man is worse than the incontinent.) of the states named,
then, the latter is rather a kind of softness; the former is self-
indulgence.
While to the incontinent man is opposed the continent, to the soft
is opposed the man of endurance; for endurance consists in resisting,
while continence consists in conquering, and resisting and conquering
are different, as not being beaten is different from winning; this
is why continence is also more worthy of choice than endurance. Now
the man who is defective in respect of resistance to the things which
most men both resist and resist successfully is soft and effeminate;
for effeminacy too is a kind of softness; such a man trails his cloak
to avoid the pain of lifting it, and plays the invalid without thinking
himself wretched, though the man he imitates is a wretched man.
The case is similar with regard to continence and incontinence. For
if a man is defeated by violent and excessive pleasures or pains,
there is nothing wonderful in that; indeed we are ready to pardon
him if he has resisted, as Theodectes' Philoctetes does when bitten
by the snake, or Carcinus' Cercyon in the Alope, and as people who
try to restrain their laughter burst out into a guffaw, as happened
to Xenophantus. But it is surprising if a man is defeated by and cannot
resist pleasures or pains which most men can hold out against, when
this is not due to heredity or disease, like the softness that is
hereditary with the kings of the Scythians, or that which distinguishes
the female sex from the male.
The lover of amusement, too, is thought to be self-indulgent, but
is really soft. For amusement is a relaxation, since it is a rest
from work; and the lover of amusement is one of the people who go
to excess in this.
Of incontinence one kind is impetuosity, another weakness. For some
men after deliberating fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the
conclusions of their deliberation, others because they have not
deliberated
are led by their emotion; since some men (just as people who first
tickle others are not tickled themselves), if they have first perceived
and seen what is coming and have first roused themselves and their
calculative faculty, are not defeated by their emotion, whether it
be pleasant or painful. It is keen and excitable people that suffer
especially from the impetuous form of incontinence; for the former
by reason of their quickness and the latter by reason of the violence
of their passions do not await the argument, because they are apt
to follow their imagination.
8
The self-indulgent man, as was said, is not apt to repent; for he
stands by his choice; but incontinent man is likely to repent. This
is why the position is not as it was expressed in the formulation
of the problem, but the selfindulgent man is incurable and the
incontinent
man curable; for wickedness is like a disease such as dropsy or
consumption,
while incontinence is like epilepsy; the former is a permanent, the
latter an intermittent badness. And generally incontinence and vice
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 94
are different in kind; vice is unconscious of itself, incontinence
is not (of incontinent men themselves, those who become temporarily
beside themselves are better than those who have the rational principle
but do not abide by it, since the latter are defeated by a weaker
passion, and do not act without previous deliberation like the others);
for the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and
on little wine, i.e. on less than most people.
Evidently, then, incontinence is not vice (though perhaps it is so
in a qualified sense); for incontinence is contrary to choice while
vice is in accordance with choice; not but what they are similar in
respect of the actions they lead to; as in the saying of Demodocus
about the Milesians, 'the Milesians are not without sense, but they [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]